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For centuries, the greater Horn of Africa has been exposed to actors and influences 
crossing the Red Sea and sailing the Indian Ocean. The extension of these forces has had 
a profound effect in shaping contemporary societies and states in the sub-region over 
time. Contemporary Sudan is a fascinating example on how the extension of Islam and 
the elites-led emphasis on Arab identity has resulted in a society embracing Arab and 
Muslim culture. These characteristics in the territories that became the heartland of the 
contemporary Sudanese state translated into the formation of a nationalist governing 
elite promoting a particular form of Arab culture and interpretation of Islam as the main 
pillars of national identity for Sudan as a whole. However, the vast territories of contem-
porary Sudan are culturally highly heterogeneous. This contrasts starkly with the north-
ern political elite’s nation- and state-building project since decolonization, seeking to ho-
mogenize society through forced cultural assimilation. Since Sudan’s independence, the 
state elite imposing Arab culture and Islam has led to varying degrees of direct confron-
tation with groups that oppose such forced cultural and religious transformation. This 
chapter reflects on the role of interpretations of slavery and religion in armed opposition 
and its aftermath in Southern Sudan. It points to the use of particular views of slavery 
and religion in the two main insurgencies in 1955-1972 and 1983-2005, and reflects on 
their representations in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005). The chapter argues 
that these interpretations are related to the Orientalist image of Sudan that connects with 
the aspirations of southern Sudan’s self-determination, independence, and drift towards 
East African socio-cultural and Indian Ocean economic space. 
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Over the centuries, influences crossing the Red Sea and connected to the pre-
vailing Indian Ocean dynamics have been important in shaping the societies of 
the greater Horn of Africa. This has been the case for the social organization that 
laid the foundation for contemporary Sudan. Historically, various actors sought 
to establish hegemonic power over the territories that extend over contemporary 
Sudan. Here, as in many other places in the world, cultural influences from far-
away lands, spread through peaceful interaction or conquest, over a long period 
of time, were significant. In the case of today’s Sudan, historical narratives tend 
to lend support to the importance to Islamic and Arabic cultural influences from 
the Arabian Peninsula, across the Red Sea and through Egypt, as those sculpting 
contemporary social organization and identities.
However, the territories of what constitutes contemporary Sudan were highly 
culturally heterogeneous before the arrival of Islam and the later overwhelming 
emphasis on Arab culture. While the extension of Islam was largely pacific, it 
also involved conquest and violence. One generation after the death of Prophet 
Muhammad, Muslim armies invaded Africa. Over the centuries, the kingdoms 
in the territories that later came to be known as northern Sudan were slowly 
annexed to Islam’s sphere of influence as a result of migration, peaceful assimila-
tion and conflict. In pre-Islamic times, Arab migrations to Sudan appear to have 
originated from Egypt and across the Red Sea, which set the pattern for later 
migrations (Hasan, 2003, p.11). From the 9th century onwards, economic motiva-
tions related to trade, and notably slaves that initially came from the western and 
central Bilad al-Sudan, among other commercial items, and mining of gold and 
emeralds, drove many Arabs to migrate to the heartlands of what constitutes 
contemporary Sudan (Hasan, 2003, p. 11, 17-18). By the 16th century this move-
ment eventually overwhelmed the kingdoms of Nubia and Alwa, while Arab mi-
grants settled in Butana and Gezira along the Nile as well as in the lowland areas 
of Kordofan and Darfur. Moving in these areas, they interacted and frequently 
intermarried with locals, which gradually produced mixed, at times culturally 
Arabized, frontier communities (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006, p.22). 
Over time, sectors of the Arabized part of the population gained influence in 
the local communities. This was due largely to their increasing societal promi-
nence, often as traders, which tended to promote the Islamic religious culture 
that was gradually transmitted to other sections of the population, “… many of 
whom adopted Islam, some Arab customs and Arabic (though many Nubians, 
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Beja and others kept their ancient tongues)” (Hasan, 2003, p.25).1 The patriarchal 
system dictated by Islam contrasted with the Nubian matriarchal structure and 
according to some authors fostered the prominence of the Arabized peoples (‘Abd 
al-Rahim, 1970, p.135-6; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006, p.22). The gradual expansion 
of Islam then led to most societies in central, eastern, and western Sudan gradu-
ally adopting the new religion. Although mixed with local traditions and belief 
systems it became mostly celebrated in its local Sufi form.2 After the demise of the 
Nubian kingdoms in the early 14th century, notably the indigenous Sennar and 
Darfur sultanates became influential in territories of today’s central and western 
Sudan, respectively. Their spheres of influence extended from the borderlands 
of contemporary southern Sudan to the northern territories bordering today’s 
Egypt until first Sennar and then Darfur had to give way to the Ottoman invasion 
in the course of the 19th century.
The conquest by the Ottoman Egyptian viceroy Muhammad Ali is often con-
sidered the prelude to the making of a centralized polity in Sudan. Among Ali’s 
prime motivations in occupying the lands south of Egypt was to obtain slaves to 
strengthen his army. At its height, the Ottoman dominion bordered Abyssinia 
(Ethiopia) and had its frontier lands extend to Darfur, southern Sudan, and the 
Red Sea coast. Yet, in 1885 the Ottoman rule collapsed before the Mahdist revo-
lution that drew heavily from the support of the Ansar (the Mahdi’s followers) 
from various parts of Sudan, but notably including cattle-herding Baggara from 
Kordofan. One of the major grievances behind the rebellion was the suppression 
of the slave trade which undermined the livelihoods of many Arab jallaba trad-
ers who by now had largely moved from Bilad al-Sudan to southern Sudan. The 
state during the Mahdist period (1885-1899) engaged in continuous warfare, and 
slave raids in southern Sudan continued. The administration incorporated elites 
that had been influential during the Ottoman period, giving the centralized state 
a degree of continuity. Still, the Mahdist experiment was short-lived and by 
1899 the Anglo-Egyptian army had taken control of most of northern and cen-
tral Sudan. Anglo-Egyptian rule, under de facto British administration, further 
consolidated the centralized administration initially put in place by the Ottoman 
rulers under the British and Egyptian colonial elite. The slave trade was largely 
suppressed but slavery continued to exist in northern Sudan, while southern 
Sudan was cut-off for more than a decade and subjected to a different colonial 
1 Some prominent authors have theorized that the spread of Islam and Arabic culture in Sudan was facilitated by 
the increasing wealth of part of the Arabized sections that converted them into a desired source of husbands for 
Nubian and other local women, while at the same time culturally Arabized Muslim women were unable to marry 
non-Muslims (Mazrui, 1973, p.72-3; Deng, 1995, p.80).
2 For more on Sufism in Sudan, see e.g. Warburg (2003), Karrar (1992), and Daly (1985). 
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policy seeking to preserve the “native” way of life while promoting Christianity 
and Western education. 
The process of decolonization, initiated in the 1940s, brought remarkably little 
change to the state and governance. The post-colonial state largely inherited the 
dominant elites, organization and structure from the Anglo-Egyptian colonial 
state. The nationalist movement was dominated by the leaderships of the north-
ern Sufi brotherhoods, the Mahdists and Khatmiyya, which had become domi-
nant forces partly due to their collaboration with the colonial masters.3 One of 
its main features, which marked both continuity and change, was the emphasis 
on national identity based on the most important self-defining features of the 
Sudanese political elite, Arab culture and Islam. Following the contours of the 
established political identity perceptions of the small well-educated elite, this 
project was highly exclusive and sought to maintain the concentration of political 
and economic power. An important part of this political project was the cultural 
homogenization of Sudan by using state policies to assimilate its diverse peoples 
through active promotion of Arabization and Islamization. Failing this, the resis-
tant sectors of the population on the edges of the state were subjected to margin-
alization and exclusion. Essentially, they were deprived of effective political par-
ticipation, economic development and social integration that would provide a 
degree of ownership towards the state, subjecting them to perpetual poverty and 
deprivation compared  to the Arabized and Islamicized groups in central Sudan.
The political elite’s hegemonic project appears to have faced most opposition 
in those communities that were least integrated with the state and whose cul-
tural and ethno-political identities contrasted with the Arab-Muslim dominated 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical state order. From the 1940s onwards, among 
the most adamant against Arabization and Islamicization of their local societies 
were a selection of members of the contemporary southern Sudanese elite who 
saw forced cultural assimilation, in the historical context of slavery and perpetual 
racial inequality, as an outright assault on their own cultural dignity and values. 
This was due in part to the perception of not being treated equally by the Arab-
Muslim governing elite, and the feeling of exclusion from political power at the 
centre of Sudanese polity, as well as a sentiment of resistance towards assimila-
tion into the Arab-Muslim culture and the attempt to promote a regional iden-
tity in southern Sudan. Among the mission-educated southern elite there was 
likely an element of fear that being unable to prevent cultural assimilation would 
gradually result in the southern intelligentsia becoming obsolete. The southern 
elite would lose local constituencies to the national elite, and eventually a whole-
3 See e.g. Niblock (1989), Karrar (1992), and Warburg (2003).
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sale cultural transformation would take place resulting in the eradication of lo-
cal southern ways of life and conversion of southerners as a whole into a class 
perpetually servile to the “Arab north”. The promotion of Arab culture and Islam 
provoked resistance among sections of the southern elite in parts of southern 
Sudan, and precipitated mobilization for anti-state activities to counter the per-
ceived repressive policies.
This chapter explores interpretations of slavery and religion in the context 
of armed opposition in southern Sudan, and points to their connection with the 
aspiration for self-determination and an independent polity aligned with East 
Africa. The chapter does not aspire to give a comprehensive account on slav-
ery, religion or the complex insurgencies themselves, but seeks to show that 
Orientalist views and images of Sudan became apparent in the political project 
aimed at separating the southern region from the rest of Sudan. Interpretations 
of slavery and religion were used to justify southern self-determination and inde-
pendence, and have served to legitimize its drift towards the East African socio-
cultural and Indian Ocean economic space.  
Slavery and Religion in the Making of “Sudan”
Over the centuries, the territories that form today’s Sudan became Islamicized. 
The central areas of this region also became gradually culturally Arabized in 
terms of language, religion, and customs. In the presence of intense 19th slave 
trade and slave holding in north-central Sudan, and in connection with the at-
tempt to preserve the lucrative slave trade by sectors of northern Sudanese elites, 
a discourse of a particular kind of social hierarchy emerged in which adherence 
to Arab culture and Islam justified higher social status, and were used to legiti-
mize access to economic and political power.4 This stratification included a social 
perception of race, in which the slave, considered the lowest status (Deng, 1995b, 
p.369-400, 484-5), constituted the starkest contrast to the most ideal forms of Arab 
and Muslim social and cultural purity.5
The slave trade in the northernmost territories of contemporary Sudan origi-
nated in the 7th century. This was the prelude for many Arabs engaging in com-
merce taking up lucrative slave trading in the region. Until the 19th century trade 
among the Sudanic kingdoms was relatively low in numbers in comparison to 
what followed during the period of Ottoman Egyptian domination. Particularly 
4 See e.g. Deng (1995a, 1995b) and Jok (2001, 2007).
5 Idris (2001, 2005) views Sudan as a “racialized state” in which social race, measured by excellence in Arab 
culture (language and customs) and Islam, defines societal status and the right to claim economic and political 
power.
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the southern fringes of the Keira (Darfur) and Sennar (south-central Sudan) 
served as major sources of slaves forming part of the overall Trans-Saharan trade 
as well as that across the Red Sea. The captives taken from the southern frontiers, 
largely from today’s southern Darfur, South Kordofan and Bahr al-Ghazal, came 
from societies that were outside the limits of the respective states. Their religious 
status appears to have been less of a factor in deciding their enslavable status.6     
Most of north-central Sudan had become Muslim in the centuries following 
the Arab expansion. From the 16th century onwards Sufi orders originating in 
the Middle East and practising mystical form of Islam based on a personal re-
lationship with God had become increasingly popular and gained influence in 
northern and central Sudan.7 Sufism became a significant and resilient part of 
shaping social organization in which the brotherhoods played an important role. 
The societal importance of the major Sufi and religious orders allowed them to 
accumulate economic power and political importance, leading to the establish-
ment of sectarian organizations as power centres in the context of the political 
order of the state. These formations hosted prominent sections of Sudan’s politi-
cal elite until their later marginalization during the military dictatorship of Jaafar 
Nimeiri (1969-1985). 
The structures of centralized state inherited by contemporary Sudan origi-
nated in the colonial period. The “Sudanese” administration replacing the co-
lonial state during decolonization inherited the governing apparatus derived 
largely from the need to control the extensive territories and extract resources. 
It was centralized in Khartoum which was a strategically opportune location in 
the centre where the Blue and White Nile met. In order to consolidate their rule, 
the Ottoman Egyptians had initially chosen to collaborate with sections of the 
central riverine Shaigiyya peoples and the sectarian Khatmiyyah Sufi order based 
in Kassala, both of which seized the opportunity to benefit from cooperation 
with the colonial state. Consequently, the Ottoman Egyptian rule in these ar-
eas became strongest. However, the colonial state faced a number of revolts and 
in the early 1880s the harsh rule had resulted in a violent anti-colonial move-
ment by Muhammad Ahmad, who claimed to be and was accepted by many 
as the Mahdi. Originating in Kordofan, the movement drew particularly sup-
port among the Baggara many of whom became Mahdist followers, the Ansar. 
Similarly to a number of other Muslim groups in contemporary Sudan, the 
Baggara have manufactured genealogies for generations that trace their lineage 
6 On slavery in pre-colonial Sudan, see e.g. O’Fahey (1973) and O’Fahey and Spaulding (1974).
7 According to Woodward (2003, p. 96), “The politics of Islam from the eighteenth century onward was a reflection 
of the growth of the Sufi orders, or turuq (singular tariqa), who came into Sudan and steadily grew in size”.
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back to Muslim ancestors, and, despite being mixed peoples, they embrace Arab 
culture (Cunnison, 1971, p.186-96). 
The rebellion grew quickly and extended in different regions due to the 
Egyptian rule that had made life increasingly hard due to high taxation, corrup-
tion and attempts to abolish the slave trade on which many merchants depended. 
Faced by the overwhelming popular revolt, the state collapsed and was replaced 
by the Mahdist Islamic administration. However, although the Mahdists showed 
animosity towards the former regime collaborators and drove the Khatmiyyah 
out, their government did depend on officials who had formed part of the former 
administration. As a result, the new regime continued to rely on sections of the 
north-central riverine peoples, namely Shaigiyyah, but also Jaaliyyin and Danaqla, 
to administer the state. This not only promoted sections of the central-riverine 
groups in the prevailing social order, but laid the foundation for their future 
prominence.
During this time in north-central Sudan, the idea of awlad al-balad (sons of 
the land) was adopted by the “fathers” (earlier generations) to claim a socially 
prominent position mainly among the Shaiqiyyah and Jaaliyyin. It came to be used 
as identification of belonging to the prominent state elite (Adam, Bartlett, and 
Nour, 2009, p.7), which as a whole wielded economic and political power. This 
“invention of tradition”8 had wide reaching consequences largely because the 
educated northern elite promoted the discourse to advance the historical narra-
tives of “Arab” conquests and superiority in Sudan, and thereby claimed owner-
ship of the Sudanese polity. In the course of decolonization it therefore estab-
lished a core of elite individuals claiming a socially defined exclusive right to 
power within the political structures of the state. Their self-proclaimed “pure” 
Arab and Muslim identity, justified by claims to generations of Arab and Muslim 
lineage, gave this exclusive group the right to power and generally disqualified 
other elites from exercising state power collectively. Although members of other, 
marginalized, elites have held positions of power, they have never been allowed 
to form collective blocs that could shift true economic and political state power 
from awlad al-balad.
British colonial rule had also contributed to the social prominence and sym-
bolic capital of Arab identity and culture. Professing European superiority over 
the local societies, the British perceived Sudanese “Arabs” as largely “semi-civi-
lized”, and the people of the southern territories as “blacks” and “savages”. They 
deemed sections of the riverine groups and the influential heads of the sectarian 
orders, whom they considered “Arabs”, as the most useful collaborators of the 
8 See e.g. Hobsbawm and Ranger (1992). 
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colonial state and relied on them to help to administer the polity. This way, the 
exclusive British ruling methods followed the practice of governance initiated 
during the Turkiyyah, and perpetuated political sectarianism, tribalism, and the 
use of culture for domination and racism (El Zain, 1996, p.525), the latter of which 
had originated in social subjugation related to the perceptions of “Arab” superi-
ority. 
In certain circumstances, collaboration with the colonial state was highly ben-
eficial in terms of wealth and status. For instance, elite sectors of the riverine 
peoples who occupied administrative positions, as well as some privileged indi-
viduals connected to the leading Sufi and sectarian orders, were able to acquire 
higher education at Gordon College, Sudan’s main institution of higher learning. 
Modern education, participation in the colonial administration and British views 
of the more sophisticated central riverine Sudanese, in comparison with the pe-
ripheral populations and borderlanders, gave fertile ground for growth of the 
attitude of superiority among these elites. Moreover, the heads of the leading Sufi 
movements and sectarian orders benefited significantly from their collaboration. 
Particularly Sayyid Abd Rahman al-Mahdi (the neo-Mahdists) and Sayyid Ali 
al-Mirghani (Khatmiyyah), used their large social constituencies and sectarian ri-
valry to extract resources and strengthen their social status. The British feared the 
mobilization capacity of each movement that could be used against the state, and 
sought to keep their leaderships content by proportioning economic wealth and 
allowing them to exert influence over large sections of the northern Sudanese 
population.
In the social order of the colonial state which to an extent privileged Arab-
Muslim identification, it was southern Sudan that contrasted the most. The 
British perceived the territories roughly south of the 10th parallel north as “sav-
age” and in need of civilization, which was deemed to come through Christianity 
and Western education. Missionary societies were endorsed in southern Sudan to 
provide such education. Realizing that southerners might be prey to Arabic and 
Islamic influences brought by officials and merchants from the north, the colonial 
masters became protectionist. Particularly following the nationalist current in the 
early 1920s which mainly shook northern Sudan, the protectionist attitude mani-
fested itself in the promotion of native administration based on appointed “trib-
al” chiefs and separate rule according to the isolationist Southern Policy (Abdel 
Rahim, 1969, p.49-51, 75). The Policy, separating southern Sudan from the north, 
was progressively implemented from 1920-1930 (until it was abandoned in 1946), 
and Western historiographers often see it as a defining period for cementing dif-
ferences between northern and southern Sudan. This view, which portrays the 
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British effort to isolate southern Sudan as an effort to protect the “noble savage” 
from Arab and Islamic domination and slavery, has been instrumental in shap-
ing the Western approaches to Sudan. It also permitted the instrumentalization 
of the sense of difference between northern and southern Sudan by the southern 
Sudanese separatist leadership in the attempt to achieve its objectives of self-
determination and/or an independent state.  
Interpretations of Slavery and Religion during Decoloniza-
tion and Early Armed Opposition
The changing political landscape after the Second World War, including in-
creasing superpower pressure and local demands, pushed the British to decolo-
nize Sudan. This process was conducted hastily in a ten-year period largely be-
cause of the fear of Egypt successfully annexing Sudan and it falling out of the 
sphere of British influence. Sections of the educated riverine Sudanese national-
ists, projecting their Arab-Muslim self-identification as the basis for Sudanese na-
tional identity, were vocal advocators of the end of colonial rule. While the neo-
Mahdists who formed the Umma party sought independence, Khatmiyyah and 
its political wing, the National Unionist Party (NUP), leaned towards Sudan’s 
association with Egypt. The British viewed the northern intelligentsia composed 
of the sectarian elite, and associated educated class, as the fittest to govern Sudan 
and inherit control of the administration. The decolonization process, initiated in 
1946, resulted in the “Sudanization” of public administration and security forces, 
which in practice meant that they became dominated by the northern riverine 
elites and their constituencies. 
In the process of decolonization, the Southern Policy was abandoned and the 
southern provinces were re-annexed to northern Sudan. In 1947 the British con-
voked a conference in Juba to assess the attitudes of hand-picked members of 
the southern elite towards reunification with the north, which had already been 
decided on. Although the sentiments of fear and mistrust expressed by southern-
ers at the conference are apparent in its documented proceedings (RJC, 1947), the 
British eventually re-annexed southern provinces to northern Sudan despite dis-
agreements among themselves about the possible consequences.9 The southern 
representatives were initially assured of safeguards when reincorporated into 
northern Sudan, and the northern political forces that had been actively present 
9 A number of the British administrators in southern Sudan were against the reunification due to fears that 
southern Sudan could not stand up for itself and would be subjugated.
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at the conference promised full consideration of a federal solution for Sudan fol-
lowing southern demands.
It was the exclusive Sudanization and reunification, which primarily trig-
gered the southern fears of renewed northern domination. In the context of the 
electoral campaign for the first parliamentary election in 1953, the NUP (linked to 
Khatmiyyah and backed by Egypt), which emerged as victorious, promised south-
erners priority when administrative positions in the southern provinces would 
be Sudanized (Ruay, 1994, p.69).  However, when this promise failed to material-
ize because southerners were considered mostly unequipped for the positions 
and disqualified,10 the mistrust towards the northern “Arabs”, combined with the 
memory of violent subjugation and slavery which the missionary education and 
oral histories in the southern communities had undoubtedly maintained, began 
to turn into contempt and hatred. The influx of northern administrators, teachers, 
and senior army and police officers into the southern provinces generated these 
adverse sentiments. They joined with that of impotence of gaining economic and 
political power (mainly jobs and effective representation able to secure southern 
rights), while the northern “Arabs” seemed to enjoy both of these and take advan-
tage of their privileged position in southern Sudan.
A number of authors mention the collective sentiments of fear, anxiety, and 
mistrust towards the northerners as being important to the understanding of 
conflict formation in southern Sudan.11 In such situations, the local leaders may 
play a significant role in encouraging and instrumentalizing such feelings, which 
serves to fuel the existing sense of insecurity towards the other (Arfi, 1998; Buzan, 
Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998; McSweeney, 1999). Indeed, the interpretation of 
slavery as a violent form of extreme subjugation and exploitation and the fear of 
its return in the context of northern “Arab” domination contributed to the radi-
calization of opposition and played a significant role in the rise of  insurgency in 
southern Sudan in the 1950s.
These collective fears of the northern “Arab” were particularly acute in south-
ern Sudan. It was likely due in part to the lack of contact with northerners be-
cause the British administrators cut most of southern Sudan off from interaction 
with the northern “Arab”, and to the Western missionaries extending Christian 
and to an extent anti-northern and anti-Islamic values among the members of 
the embryonic mission-educated southern elite. The colonial administration had 
sought to build a buffer against Arabic and Muslim influences by socializing 
10 In the final stage of the Sudanization process, southerners obtained 6 of 800 administrative positions (Taisier 
and Matthews, 1999: 203).
11 See e.g. Eprile (1974), Holt and Daly (2000), Collins (2005), and Wassara (2007).
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members of the southern elite along Western principles, using English instead 
of Arabic or local vernacular languages, and deliberately sought to consolidate 
Christianity. But at the same time the northern “Arab” became demonized as a 
term that was used and later instrumentalized in rallying for political opposition. 
From the Anglo-Egyptian colonial, a dominant narrative emerged in southern 
Sudan that the British were good to the southerners, while the “Arabs” sought 
to forcefully assimilate southern Sudan through Islamization and Arabization in 
order to perpetually dominate and subjugate it and its peoples.
Armed with this understanding, a selection of members of the southern 
Sudanese elite became antagonistic towards what was viewed as northern riverine 
“Arab” domination. Apart from perceivably marginalizing southerners during 
Sudanization, the new rulers discarded the earlier promises of political safe-
guards and possible federal solution for southern Sudan. By the mid-1950s the 
antagonism had turned into hatred, particularly in areas in the southernmost 
Equatoria Province following the  farcical trial of a local member of parliament, 
Elia Kuze, and when southern workers in the Nzara agricultural scheme were 
laid off while more northern personnel was simultaneously hired. In 1955, a 
conspiracy to murder northern army officials in southern Sudan, to which some 
prominent southerners were linked, came to light and, soon after, disturbances 
targeted northern “Arabs” and a mutiny broke out among southern army troops 
in Torit, Equatoria. Eventually the mutiny was repressed with British help, but 
some soldiers escaped with their weapons and began a low-intensity insurgency 
that for a number of years amounted mainly to occasional banditry and isolated 
violent incidents. The government response to the disturbances in which a num-
ber of northerners died was characterized by revenge. A wave of terror followed 
which included arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, torture and killings in southern 
Sudan. This generated further fear and antagonism locally.
In 1958, a military coup resulted in the end of the brief democratic experiment 
in Sudan and the Ibrahim Abboud’s military junta (1958-64) assuming power. In 
this situation, the state embarked on a mission of forced cultural assimilation to 
end resistance in southern Sudan, which according to the government was due to 
foreign agents, mainly the Christian missionaries.12 The regime imposed a policy 
of active Islamization and pushed the Arabic language in southern Sudan. It was 
accompanied by large-scale violence in counterinsurgency operations, which 
mainly targeted the civilian population (Eprile, 1974). In this way, religion and 
language were politicized and used as tools for forced cultural assimilation, to 
12 See e.g. Poggo (2002).
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serve the attempt to cement the governing Arab-Muslim elite’s domination in 
southern Sudan. 
Yet, the Abboud regime’s measures were unable to annihilate the armed op-
position, which began to receive increasing external support in the early 1960s. 
Some of this assistance came from Christian organizations, with Equatorian 
priest Father Saturnino Lohure becoming an important figure in channelling re-
sources (Gray, 2002, p.120). The regime’s policy to expel Christian missionaries 
from southern Sudan (1962-1964) followed the perception that missionaries were 
agents of foreign powers. This led to foreign Christian players becoming active 
in supporting the southern opposition. The repression, but without sufficient 
strength to end the rebellion, and the external support, allowed the expansion of 
political opposition into a number of armed factions and non-armed resistance. 
The antagonism towards the northern “Arab” state was an mobilization impor-
tant factor and fuelled the rebellion. Another crucial element was external sup-
port, which strengthened the armed opposition. 
In the course of the conflict, various opposition factions controlled areas and 
their communities in southern Sudan. Still, it was Joseph Lagu, who had defected 
from the army and founded his Anya-Nya rebel command, that controlled much 
of the arms flows to the opposition, who unified the rebel groups under his lead-
ership and the later Southern Sudan Liberation Front/Movement (SSLF/M). In 
May 1969, Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri had taken power in Sudan in an Arab socialist 
officers’ army coup. He increasingly curbed external support for southern reb-
els by improving relations with the southern neighboring states, intensified the 
counterinsurgency effort and promised development in southern Sudan. Both 
through Lagu’s unification of the rebel command and Nimeiri’s successful coun-
terinsurgency policy the way for a negotiated settlement became possible.13
Finally, in 1972, the government and the SSLF/M agreed on peace in Addis 
Ababa with Ethiopian mediation. This became a reality largely because of the 
SSLF/M’s weakening position and Nimeiri’s Arab socialist approach, which for 
the first time officially recognized the different southern way of life that was re-
flected in the policy on language and religion. The Addis Ababa peace agreement 
granted southern Sudan self-government and limited autonomy by uniting its 
three original provinces (Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile) into one 
region, and ensured that English became recognized as the “principle language” 
of the southern region (AAA, 1972, Chapter II, Article 6.). Although it did not 
directly address the issue of religion or social subjugation of southerners, it 
13 There are a number of accounts on the insurgency and peace negotiations. See in e.g. Eprile (1974) and Alier 
(1990).
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was implicit that southern self-government could buffer Islamic influences and 
protect southern rights. The 1973 permanent constitution, in turn, recognized 
Christianity and other “noble spiritual beliefs” (Part II, Chapter I, Article 16), and 
the constitutional validity of the Addis Ababa Agreement (Part I, Article 8) (PCS, 
1973). The Addis Ababa peace agreement can be seen as a political settlement that 
sought to protect southern Sudan from the perceived northern “Arab” domina-
tion. But in the end the Southern Region remained subject to the arbitrary and 
unchecked political influence of the leadership of the dictatorial national govern-
ment, which was a major factor leading to its eventual failure.
The Second Insurgency in Southern Sudan
The second rebellion in southern Sudan emerged in the context of abolition 
of the Southern Region and its institutions. President Nimeiri had personally in-
fluenced the southern leadership throughout the 1970s,14 and dissolved the re-
gional political institutions in 1980 and finally re-divided southern Sudan into 
its three original provinces in June 1983. These actions heightened the sentiment 
of renewed northern “Arab” control and were vigorously opposed in southern 
Sudan. They coincided with grievances over the partially failed integration of the 
former rebel military elements into the army after the Addis Ababa Agreement. 
A military conspiracy among officers, who claimed dissatisfaction over the politi-
cal developments, triggered mutinies, which escalated into a rebellion.15
By the early 1970s Islamic resurgence was penetrating northeast Africa. In 
this regional context, soon after a failed 1971 allegedly communist coup attempt 
and the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, the government initiated a policy shift. 
By the mid-1970s, Nimeiri considered that the northern sectarian political elite, 
which for the first time had lost power in 1969 and had been driven into exile, 
needed to be accommodated. The sectarian leadership had found refuge in the 
Gulf States, and had staged aborted coups with external backing. Clearly, substi-
tuting the northern elite organizations with southern Sudan as an unprecedented 
regime constituency had been insufficient to consolidate the regime against po-
litical instability caused by the exiled northern political factions. While it had be-
come apparent that in the regional context of Islamic resurgence embracing Islam 
would be beneficial, Nimeiri found support from the Sudanese Muslim brothers 
who had formed a minority party formation of Islamic Charter Front (ICF) in the 
14 See e.g. Collins (2008, pp. 112, 115, 133, 134).
15 See Madut-Arop (2006) on an extensive account on the military conspiracy.
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1960s. This allowed Nimeiri to avoid sharing power with the still-powerful and 
potentially threatening sectarian parties. As a result, Nimeiri, a skilful political 
pragmatist, embarked on “national reconciliation” with the most influential and 
potentially threatening northern sectarian opposition factions, and invited them 
to return to Sudan but deliberately marginalized them to maintain control. The 
regime began favouring the Muslim brothers as its new constituency and se-
cured backing from Saudi Arabia and the United States while it became increas-
ingly inclined to abolish the Southern Region. 
The Muslim brothers advocated Sudan’s Arab and Muslim identity. The 
National Islamic Front (NIF), founded by Hassan al-Turabi in 1976, and increas-
ingly politically influential, was among the most eager northern elite organiza-
tions to assimilate the peripheries through active Islamization. As such, it op-
posed any special recognition of southern Sudan, and perceived any concessions 
to the southerners as the state giving in to separatism and outright secessionism. 
However, this was not new since the sectarian parties had already been con-
cerned about the possibility of southern secession since decolonization, and gen-
erally echoed the concerns of the Islamists. As a result, Nimeiri’s national recon-
ciliation became a process of rapprochement, involving sections of the northern 
Arab-Muslim elite and leading to marginalization of the southern elite and the 
undermining of southern political autonomy. 
In this context, certain Islamist sections of the northern elite thrived. Receiving 
financing from the Arabian Peninsula and diaspora, and controlling much of the 
banking and economic sector in Sudan, Turabi’s NIF grew in power and influ-
ence. Under increasing pressure, Nimeiri made concessions to Islamist elements, 
notably regarding the issue of southern Sudan. Having been involved in the poli-
tics of the Southern Region throughout the 1970s, and to an extent fuelling the 
ethnically unfolding rivalries in the region, Nimeiri became increasingly inclined 
to abolish southern self-government. 
However, Nimeiri was also under pressure to  salvage the Sudanese economy 
which was on a downward spiral. Oil had been discovered in southern Sudan 
near the northern Sudanese border in the 1970s and Nimeiri sought central gov-
ernment control of the oil fields. Seeking to capture the oil-rich territory, the gov-
ernment distorted the administrative boundaries and in 1980 Nimeiri created a 
new Unity State, but southern politicians discovered the attempt to manipulate 
the regions’ borders and denounced it. A dispute over the oil issue flared up and 
eventually became an important factor in influencing Nimeiri’s decision to abol-
ish southern self-government.16
16 See e.g. Alier (1990) for an account on the dispute and its effects.
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In May 1983, before the eventual break-up of the Southern Region, a number 
of orchestrated mutinies took place in the south and led to a second rebellion. 
Securing external support mainly from Ethiopia, the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) led by John Garang emerged as the most power-
ful among the competing southern armed factions. The revolutionary SPLM/A 
manifesto detailed a number of grievances, which were mainly related to north-
ern “Arab” political and economic domination. Following the outbreak of the 
rebellion, Nimeiri first abolished the southern autonomy that formed part of the 
1973 Sudanese constitution in an unconstitutional move, and in September 1983 
declared Islamic shari’a law in the whole country. These constituted symbolic 
steps subjugating southern Sudan and propelling state-led Islamization. The two 
measures fuelled the war as they caused re-emergence of fears of violent north-
ern “Arab” domination of southern Sudan, and played into favourable condi-
tions for mobilization of armed opposition. As one sign of a growing feeling of 
insecurity when faced with Islamization policies, many local people in southern 
Sudan turned to Christianity for solace and support (Johnson, 2003, p. 35). 
In April 1985 a popular revolution in northern Sudan toppled Nimeiri, and 
the Arab-Muslim political elite-led multi-party system was restored. The gov-
ernment under the neo-Mahdist leader Sadiq al-Mahdi that followed sought to 
end the war in southern Sudan. However, in June 1989 the NIF took power in a 
military coup. The new regime, headed by Omar al-Bashir, with initially critical 
behind-the-scenes support from Turabi, further politicized religion as an effort 
to implement its “National Salvation Revolution” that entailed the building of 
an Islamic state through societal transformation (Voll, 2000, p.165-6). The NIF 
regime took radical measures to eradicate opposition, using religion in its coun-
terinsurgency campaign while seeking to Islamize defiant populations, and de-
clared jihad against the insurgents. It sought to forcefully assimilate local pop-
ulations into Islam, including in some regions to systematically eradicate local 
cultures.17 For instance, in southern Kordofan this effort consisted of eliminating 
those opposing the state, displacing the civil population ostensibly supporting 
them, and seeking to Islamize particularly the internally displaced who made 
their way to the government administered “peace camps” where they were sub-
jected to harsh treatment.18
The SPLM/A sought to capitalize on this situation by repeatedly highlighting 
in its propaganda how government politicized religion was an extension of its at-
17 Probably the most radical attempt for forced cultural transformation was undertaken in the Nuba Mountains. 
See e.g. Ylönen (2009).
18 Ibid.
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tempt to dominate the rest of Sudan. It also portrayed religious and ethnic differ-
ences within its organization and in southern Sudan as non-issues, and it sought 
to maintain this image until and beyond the end of the war in order to feed the 
perceptions of southern Sudan as a united “Christian” and “African” front re-
sisting “Muslim” and “Arab” government’s violent repression. Highlighting the 
continuing group-based inequality and marginalization to which southern Sudan 
was subjected, it succeeded in presenting the fight against forced Arabization and 
Islamization as synonymous with the liberation of southern Sudan from north-
ern domination. This was instrumental in influencing the interested and power-
ful Western states’ approach to the conflict, and was consequently reflected in the 
peace terms. 
Peacemaking and the Break-up of Sudan
The established outside perceptions on slavery and religion featured strong-
ly in the peacemaking in Sudan. The external players most active in the peace 
process, mainly the US and a selection of European states (namely Norway, the 
UK, Italy and the Netherlands), had for long assumed the importance of histori-
cal narratives of slavery and religious subjugation as the main explanations of 
understanding political instability and armed conflict in the country. This was 
due to an extent to the Western historiography, with its orientalist overtones 
(Spaulding and Kapteijns, 1991), which has often depicted southern Sudan and 
its peoples as the victims of northern oppression. Both slavery and religion are 
inherent in the subjugation narrative, transmitting into the attitudes of external 
actors towards the main protagonists of the war in Sudan and influencing their 
relations with and approach towards the warring parties and the conflict.
Indeed, powerful narratives of slavery’s legacy of unequal status between the 
Arab-Muslims and southerners continue to appear. For instance, Jok (2007) ar-
gues that due to continuing racist attitudes in northern Sudan, the black south-
erners have had no chance of becoming full members of the “Arab” in-group and 
exercising equal rights despite adopting the cultural prerequisites, including cus-
toms, language, and religion. Others have also pointed to this persisting social 
marginalization based on physical appearance, ethnic background and cultural 
attributes (Idris, 2001, 2005; Sharkey, 2003), which has generated grievances and 
fed antagonism. Moreover, relevant to grievances related to lower social status, 
Collins (1985) has noted that in the early stages of the insurgency in southern 
Sudan some southern young men being “...the lowest economic and social scale... 
became strongly militant as well as knowledgeable of the outside world. They 
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returned regularly to their homes in the South, bringing with them pent-up hos-
tility and militancy that they developed while working as labourers on construc-
tion projects in the North” (p.138). Such attitudes have fuelled perceptions of 
“Arab-Muslim” imposed social inferiority of southerners.
The dominant Western discourses on religion and conflict in Sudan often 
emphasize the use of religion as a political weapon. In them, Islam has often 
been singled out as having played a prominent role in inciting violent conflict, 
particularly as a political tool of the Islamists. The National Congress Party 
(NCP, the former NIF) government’s use of religion has been apparent as part 
of its counterinsurgency campaigns particularly in the early 1990s against the 
SPLM/A linked insurgents of South Kordofan and southern Blue Nile, as well 
as the armed opposition groups in Darfur. By imposing strict Islamic laws, the 
regime has been able to concentrate power in  its core and its security apparatus 
on which its power largely rests.
In contrast, the protracted wars in southern Sudan, during which the govern-
ment was using religious rhetoric for mobilization, enabled the local opposition 
movements to portray Christianity as a counterforce to forced Islamization. The 
perception in the West, and elsewhere, that the reductionist view given in the 
media about the war was largely responsible, emerged, in which southern Sudan 
and its peoples were victims of a violent form of radical Islamism propagated by 
the government in Khartoum. This generated sympathy for southern Sudan, and 
as the wars dragged on, played into the hands of those who promoted its seces-
sion from Sudan.
In the final stages of the peace negotiations leading to the 2005 Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA), the SPLM/A leadership found itself in a strong position. 
It was backed by the powerful Western states, especially the US, which largely 
positioned themselves against the Islamist regime in Khartoum, and could use 
the “Arab” domination narrative in order to try to influence these actors for fa-
vourable negotiation outcomes. Despite little evidence of slavery in contempo-
rary Sudan, at least in the sense and magnitude that had occurred in the 19th 
century,19 it became a topic that the SPLM/A could exploit and that eventually 
formed part of the final CPA. As a result, the SPLM/A, which portrayed itself as 
the voice of victims of “Arab” and Islamist domination and subjugation, was suc-
cessful in including at least part of its anti-slavery, religious freedom, and anti-
discrimination agenda as stipulations in the agreement. Even more importantly, 
however, highlighting the protracted violent domination and massive human 
19 See e.g. Veldkamp (2014) for more evidence and first-hand accounts on abduction and slavery during the second 
civil war in southern Sudan. 
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rights violations present in the negotiations also captured sympathies, and con-
tributed to the otherwise favourable terms for the SPLM/A in the CPA, including 
the clause for a self-determination referendum and the possibility of seceding 
from Sudan (CPA, 2005). 
In contrast, the Sudanese governments have generally used “Arab” and 
“Muslim” labels to gain external support especially from Arab States. They have 
used the historical links and cultural affinities between northern Sudan and the 
Arabian Peninsula, and the current NCP government has been no stranger to ex-
ploiting these generally warm relations. Among the latest manifestations of this 
is Sudan’s involvement in the Saudi-led coalition intervening in the civil war in 
Yemen, which has resulted in economic support to improve the ailing finances 
of the Sudanese regime. The NCP has benefited from crucial financial assistance 
and investments from the states in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as from politi-
cal support from individual Arab states and the Arab League. 
However, in the peace process facilitated largely by the Western states these 
relations could be viewed as an impediment. Having been accused of harbour-
ing Islamist terrorism throughout the 1990s, in part due to having hosted Osama 
bin Laden and allegedly participated in the assassination attempt of Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak in 1995, the US blacklisted and imposed sanctions on 
Sudan. This led to further deterioration of already problematic relations, cul-
minating in a political confrontation in which the US and its Western allies ap-
peared increasingly to be siding with the SPLM/A and other Sudanese opposi-
tion forces. In these circumstances of mounting international pressure, Khartoum 
attempted to improve its position by seemingly changing its posture. Particularly 
the US was keen on Sudan’s volte-face, and welcomed Sudan’s newly expressed 
willingness to assist in intelligence on Islamist terrorism after the 1998 embassy 
bombings in East Africa and the 9/11 attacks attributed to al-Qaeda. Khartoum’s 
cooperation and the warring parties’ seeming willingness to reach a negotiated 
end to the conflict facilitated the Inter-Governmental Agency on Development’s 
mediation efforts over which especially the US exerted significant influence.20 
The long and occasionally stagnated peace process, originating in the mid-
1990s, and involving a series of agreements notably in 2002-2003, eventually cul-
minated in the signing of the CPA in January 2005. A vast document, the 259-
page CPA clearly reflected the main external actors’ concern about political and 
economic subjugation of southern Sudan, the issue of slavery, and the politiciza-
tion of Islam. For instance, the CPA stated “No one shall be held in slavery; slav-
ery and the slave trade in all their forms shall be prohibited. No one shall be held 
20 For more on the peace process, see Young (2012) and Ylönen (2014). 
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in servitude or be required to perform forced or compulsory labour... [and that] 
... Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion...” 
(CPA, 2005, p.15). Chapter I of the CPA – also known as the Machakos Protocol, 
signed on 20 June 2002 – stipulated the requirement for religious freedom and 
that religion and customs should not determine access to public employment 
(CPA, 2005, p. 5). It also restricted Islamic shari’a law to the capital, Khartoum 
and exempted non-Muslims from its penalties, while recognizing Arabic as the 
national language and English as the language of government business (CPA, 
2005, p.23, 25-6). These provisions can be seen as important because they posed 
an attempt to remedy the perceived marginalization, exclusion, and subjugation 
of southerners (and others) in Sudan as a whole. But in this regard the CPA also 
became an ultimatum to the northern governing elite to end marginalization and 
discrimination, because failing “to make the unity of the Sudan an attractive op-
tion especially to the people of South Sudan” (CPA, 2005, p. 2) would allow them 
to vote for secession in a self-determination referendum to take place after a six-
year (2005-2011) interim period (CPA, 2005, p. 8). 
The transition period was to assess the former warring parties’ capacity to 
overcome their differences and to work together within the framework of one 
state in which the region of Southern Sudan would again exercise autonomy. 
This autonomy was guaranteed by the stipulated SPLM majority in Southern 
Sudan’s newly created political institutions (while it became a minority partner 
at national level), and crucially the SPLA becoming the formal regional security 
apparatus in charge of protecting Southern Sudan. This formalized the SPLM/A’s 
one-party domination of the region (mirroring the NCP domination in Northern 
Sudan), while giving it security safeguards which the earlier Addis Ababa agree-
ment and Southern Self-Government Act had not. Both parties committed to 
“making unity attractive” for the Southern Sudanese, including celebrating civic 
liberties and religious tolerance, and promoting economic development, while 
the Southern Sudanese could opt for secession in the self-determination referen-
dum in case unity was not made attractive during the six-year transition period. 
This way, the discourse of subjugation and religious domination continued play 
a part in the political dynamics during the interim period. 
The CPA was heavily influenced by the southern and Western views of the 
conflict, the history of violence and massive human rights violations. Following 
the sudden death of SPLM/A’s supreme leader John Garang in July 2005, seces-
sionist elements within the movement close to the new leader Salva Kiir gained 
relative importance. Their objective of gaining independence contributed to the 
SPLM/A propagated and pre-established separatist views being used to justify 
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the secession and international recognition of Southern Sudan. During the inter-
im period the SPLM/A governed Southern Sudan with an iron fist to ensure the 
desired outcome of the vote for self-determination. Expectedly, the referendum 
brought an overwhelming 98.33% vote for secession, with 97.58% voter turnout 
(SSR, 2011), and Southern Sudan became the independent Republic of South 
Sudan on 9 July 2011.
One important factor considered during Southern Sudan’s referendum, seces-
sion, and international recognition was the economic viability of the new state. 
Politically, many believed rather naively that the SPLM/A-dominated order 
would be sufficient to end armed conflict and maintain stability, and that the 
SPLM/A elite would be equipped to successfully lead the country. Economically, 
South Sudan was seen as a viable state because approximately 75% of Sudan’s 
oil reserves were located in its territory. Little consideration was given to  the 
fact that its oil needed to be piped through Sudan and subjected to Khartoum’s 
control and transit fees, and overlooking its overwhelming dependence on oil 
exports (98% of the official budget) and a potentially chronic case of “Dutch 
disease”21 in the absence of any significant agricultural and industrial sectors. 
However, alternative plans for exporting oil were made. These were accel-
erated by the crisis in which South Sudan accused Sudan of siphoning off its 
petroleum revenues and imposing excessive transit fees. This eventually led it 
to stop oil exports from its territory and the fighting of a brief but destructive 
border conflict (Ylönen, 2012). The plans to find alternative solutions for export-
ing oil also represented the South Sudanese government’s attempt to break the 
bond of dependence on Khartoum, and symbolically move South Sudan from the 
sphere of “Arab” north and the Arabian Peninsula to ever closer alignment with 
East Africa with which southern parts of the country have historically intimate 
cultural and economic ties. 
One idea which embodies this attempt was to ship oil on barges up the Nile 
to Uganda from where it could be transported to Kenya for export. Another ver-
sion of this was that oil could be transported by road in trucks either to Uganda 
or directly to Kenya from where it could be shipped out. Yet, due to infeasibility 
and likely severe environmental problems, these ideas were abandoned when 
the plan to build an alternative pipeline became increasingly serious. Initially, it 
was proposed that perhaps a pipeline could be constructed to connect with the 
already functioning Cameroon-Chad pipeline, or another one built to the Kenyan 
coast. This was not only an economic but also a strategic geo-political question 
21 “Dutch disease” is meant to describe the overwhelming dependence on oil exports relative to other sectors of 
the economy which simultaneously receive little or no sustained development effort.
124 Confronting the “Arab North”: Interpretations of Slavery and Religion in Southern Sudanese Separatist Resistance
E-Book’IS • Fluid Networks and Hegemonic Powers in the Western Indian Ocean • 2017
of crucial national importance. Any such pipeline would constitute a permanent 
tie in terms of strategic infrastructure between South Sudan and its neighbours. 
With the background of Uganda and Kenya having supported the SPLM/A for 
a long time, and the longstanding cultural and commercial ties between South 
Sudan and the two neighbouring states, the relations between South Sudan and 
its East African partners have been close. 
In this context, building a pipeline to the Port of Lamu in Kenya became an ob-
vious choice, connecting South Sudan to the Indian Ocean’s commercial sphere. 
For Kenya, the pipeline complements the Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia 
Transport (LAPSSET) corridor in the making, which forms part of its ambitious 
“Vision 2030” development plan.22 Meanwhile, relations between Juba and Addis 
Ababa are good in part due to Ethiopia’s role in mediating in the South Sudan 
civil war. Ethiopia and Djibouti are also in the process of building a transport 
corridor which they hope to eventually to extend from the Red Sea to the Atlantic 
through South Sudan (Mail & Guardian Africa, 2015). This may offer landlocked 
South Sudan yet another route to the sea in the future.
However, the current crisis in South Sudan which initially unfolded in 2013 
has pitted the country between the supporters of President Salva Kiir and the 
former Vice-President Riek Machar. The armed opposition under Machar has 
threatened to occupy the oil fields, while Khartoum has likely supported the reb-
els at least in the eastern part of South Sudan (SSNA, 2013) partly in response to 
the alleged support of South Sudanese elements for the SPLM/A-North armed 
opposition in Sudan based in South Kordofan and southern Blue Nile. Despite 
this situation, which has involved Ugandan armed forces intervention on the side 
of Salva Kiir, the construction of the pipeline connecting South Sudan, Kenya, 
and Uganda, which seeks to export oil in and from the vicinity of Lake Albert, is 
to begin in 2016 (Pipeline International, 2015). Simultaneously, any plans to im-
prove transport connections between South Sudan and Ethiopia are complicated 
by the increased instability in the Greater Upper Nile in eastern South Sudan and 
in Gambella in western Ethiopia caused by the conflict in South Sudan. It is likely 
to take years before South Sudan can decidedly diminish the relative importance 
of economic and commercial ties with the “Arab” Sudan, the Red Sea, and the 
Arab countries, and fully endorse the economic potential of its relationship with 
Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia that would tie it ever more in the broader East 
African and Indian Ocean commercial space.
22 See e.g. Lamont (2013) for more on the LAPPSET and “Vision 2030”.
125Aleksi Ylönen
E-Book’IS • Fluid Networks and Hegemonic Powers in the Western Indian Ocean • 2017
Closing Remarks
Sudan has suffered from protracted war since its independence. The two lon-
gest rebellions in the country in which millions of people perished took place in 
southern Sudan. The role of the legacy of slavery and religion in these insurgen-
cies has been debated, as they have been interpreted in different ways and used 
politically during the war and the peacemaking.
Historically, both slavery and religion have been forces used for societal or-
ganization in Sudan. The governing elites of the Sudanese state have used their 
self-proclaimed “Arab” and “Muslim” identity to justify their political and eco-
nomic power and to gain support from Arab states. They have largely sought 
to maintain the social organization based on socio-culturally hierarchical and 
stratified perceptions formed along the past conceptions of race and social sta-
tus. This has continued to perpetuate the relevance of hierarchical social order in 
contemporary Sudan. In this perception, the legacy of slavery and religion (par-
ticularly certain approaches to Islam) has been associated with and determined 
social status.
Moreover, the legacy of slavery and politicization of Islam has been linked to 
the armed conflict, especially in southern Sudan. First, the type of social subjuga-
tion marked by the legacy of slavery and politicization of Islam imposed as part 
of northern (state) domination has been mostly confronted in southern Sudan as 
external forces and resisted by large sections of the local population. Western his-
torical narratives point to this resistance and the role of northern “Arab” domina-
tion, articulated through the legacy of slavery and forced Islamization, as a source 
of fear and grievance fuelling armed opposition. While this appears to have been 
the case in the formation of the first rebellion in southern Sudan during decolo-
nization, the case of the second insurgency is less clear. Rather, it seems that the 
later southern Sudanese armed opposition, particularly the SPLM/A, was more 
successful than the earlier movements in using the belief among Western external 
players that the legacy of slavery and religious intolerance leading to discrimina-
tion and marginalization played an important role in the war. This helped to get 
the interested Western states involved.  
Second, when considering the role of religion, it can be argued that Islam and 
Christianity played a role in both rebellions. Islam’s prominent role in organiz-
ing society in northern Sudan, and the politicization and use of religion to de-
fine political and economic power and marginalize non-Arabs and non-Muslims 
has been a source of discord. The occasional use of jihad as a counterinsurgency 
mobilization tool and periods of forced Islamization appear to have further an-
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tagonized many southerners. As a counterforce, Christian proselytization took 
place in southern Sudan during the colonial period and the insurgencies, while 
numerous Christian organizations of various types were involved. This indicates 
that although religious differences of individuals may not cause rebellion, the as-
sociation of religion with power, marginalization, and domination in the society 
may lead to grievances and fear which, when exploited by the elites, favour the 
formation and sustenance of armed resistance. 
Finally, the importance of the legacy of slavery and religion in the rebellions 
in southern Sudan has been determined largely by the behaviour of the actors 
involved. Promoting the belief in the importance of both has been essential, along 
with heavily Orientalist attempts to influence external actors and approaches to 
the conflict. Adopting such views, the CPA was a crucial manifestation of this by 
paving way for the eventual break-up of Sudan, and the ever increasing associa-
tion of South Sudan with East Africa and the Indian Ocean economic space. 
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